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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE CHARGING ONE THEFT AS
SEVERAL LARCENIES, A SERIES OF THEFTS As A SINGLE LARCENY-The

gist of the crime of larceny both at common law and under statutes is a
fraudulent taking of the personal property of another with an intent
to appropriate it. 1 One taking coupled with the necessary intent normally constitutes a single offense of larceny, and normally the courts
limit their inquiry to whether there is such taking and intent; if the
finding is in the affirmative the crime of larceny is established. Yet the
courts tend to go beyond these limits of inquiry where the problem arises
whether a single offense or several distinct offenses have been com-
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mitted. Two types of situations present themselves: (I) where there is
a single taking of several articles, at the same time, and the articles
belong to different persons; ( 2) where there are several distinct takings each coupled with a criminal intent. In the :first type of situation
the courts tend to split the offense into as many different offenses as
there are wronged owners.2 In the second type of situation there normally exist as many offenses as there are takings, since each of them
involves the necessary subjective and objective elements of the crime.
Yet early precedents are found where several takings at different times
extending over a period of many years were combined by the courts
to form a single offense.3 Thus a thief who committed acts which
normally would amount to several petty larcenies (misdemeanors)
could be convicted under certain circumstances of a single grand larceny
(felony).4
It is the purpose of this comment to explore the causes and development of this situation and to indicate the present state of the law.
I.

The splitting of a single taking into several offenses evidently
originated in a misleading analogy to the civil liability of a thief. If
several articles belonging to different owners were taken at the same
time and place, the thief was held to have committed as many torts as
there were different owners. The use of this analogy disregards the fact
that civil liability for damages has nothing to do with criminal liability
for the offense against the public. This applies with particular force
to those cases where several articles, although owned by different persons, were taken from the possession of one person at the same time
and from the same place.5 However, where several articles are taken
at the same time and from the same place from the distinct possessions
of several persons, it may be argued that, since a larceny is a felonious
taking by trespass from the legal possession of another, the taking con2 32 AM. JuR. 894 (1941); cases collected in 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693 at 723
(19II); 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 967 (1913).
;a Regina v. Bleasdale, 2 Car. & K. 765, 175 Eng. Rep. 321 (1848); King v.
Ellis, 6 B. & C. 145, 108 Eng. Rep. 406 (1826).
4 The same problem arises in connection with the offenses of embezzlement,
receiving stolen property, obtaining property by fraudulent representation and others,
as well as in connection with the offense of larceny in those jurisdictions not recognizing degrees of grand and petty larceny but making the degree of punishment depend
upon the value of the property stolen.
5 In State v. Hennesey, 23 Ohio St. 339 at 347 (1879), the court stated: "The
particular ownership of the property which is the subject of a larceny, does not fall
within the definition and is not of the essence of the crime. • •. neither the legal nor
the moral quality of the act is at all affected by the fact that the property stolen,
instead of being owned by one ••. is the several property of different persons." See
also, State v. Egglesht, 41 Iowa 574 (1875).
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stitutes as many crimes as there are distinct possessions and trespasses. 5 a
The result reached by the courts is often influenced by the manner
in which the problem is presented. Upon an indictment for a single offense, the defendant may raise the question by demurrer upon the
ground of duplicity, by objecting at the trial to the introduction of
evidence concerning the taking of objects belonging to more than one
person, or by a motion that the state be ordered to prosecute only for
the taking of objects belonging to one owner. When the question is
thus presented, the great weight of authority holds that a single taking
of several objects belonging to different owners is a single offense.6
On the other hand, where defendant is charged with taking one object
belonging to A, and he pleads in bar a previous prosecution for stealing
at the same time and place an object belonging to B, the authorities are
evenly divided. Some reach the logical conclusion that a single offense
was committed, thereby barring a second prosecution,7 while others,
seeking to avoid the consequences of the double jeopardy clause, find
distinct offenses.8 A few courts grant the prosecutor an election to treat
the taking as a single offense or several separate offenses.9
It is difficult to support the view of those courts which find several
distinct offenses. The reasoning, based on the analogy to civil liability,
is not persuasive; and open to question is the policy of avoiding the
protection against double jeopardy established by both state and federal
constitutions.
2.

The second aspect of the problem involves the practice of tying
together several distinct takings from a single person into a single
offense, although the takings occurred at different times. In a recent
New York case a subway employee was convicted of grand larceny for
stealing, over a period of time, fares deposited in turnstiles by passengers. He claimed that he had committed many petty larcenies rather
5

a.Phillips v. State, 85 Tenn. 551 (1887); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass.
409 (1807).
6 People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 N. W. I 119 (1890); Chanock v. United
States, (App. D. C. 1920) 267 F. 612; 36 C. J. 803 (1924); 18 AM. & ENG. ENCYC.
LAw, 2d ed., 531,468 (1901).
7
Cases collected in 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 967 at 973 (1913); State v. Bynum,
117 N. C. 752, 23 S. E. 219 (1895); Wilson v. State, 45 Tex. 76 (1876).
8 N. Y. Const., art. 1, § 6, "No person shall be subject to be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense••.•" The Federal Constitution and nearly all state
constitutions have similar provisions. The vagueness of the double jeopardy clauses
complicates the picture. Some courts hold, for instance, that whereas previous conviction of larceny of property belonging to A bars the subsequent prosecution for stealing
property of B at the same time and place, the acquittal under the same circumstances
does not. Wright v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 629, 40 S. W. 491 (1897).
9
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 967 at 970 (1913).
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than a grand larceny, since he did not take at any one time an amount
necessary to the crime of grand larceny. Said the New York Court of
Appeals in affirming the conviction of grand larceny:
" ... Where the property is stolen from the same owner and from
the same place by a series of acts, if each taking is the result of a
separate, independent impulse, each is a separate crime; but if the
successive takings are all pursuant to a single, sustained, criminal
impulse and in execution of a general fraudulent scheme, they together constitute a single larceny, regardless of the time which
may elapse between each act." 10
Two groups of decisions unanimously support this view. Whenever commodities such as electricity, gas, water, oil, heat, power, etc.,
are stolen over a period of time, the courts without exception have
found a single larceny, a continuous offense.11 Thus, where a defendant
was charged with the taking of a stated quantity of gas on a certain
day, an English court held that one continuous transaction rather than
a series of acts was proved, the evidence indicating that the stealing
extended over a period· of years and that the gas was shut off each
night at the burner.12 Similarly the Supreme Court of Illinois found a
10 People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137, 36 N. E. (2d) 84 at 86 (1941), quoting 36
C. J. 798 (1924) (italics added). Substantially the same rule is stated in 2 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW, 12th ed., § u71 (1932). Some consideration should be given to the
conception of a "single criminal impulse" or "general scheme." The criminal intent
itself is a mere state of mind. There is no direct way to prove it. Under the above rule
a new irrational element veiled by the psychological term of "impulse" is added to
the already too many irrationalities in the criminal law. The question was first pre•
sented to the Court of Appeals of New York in 1926, People v. Gutterson, 244 N. Y.
243, 155 N. E. II3 (1926), but it was not decided because of defendant's failure to
raise the point properly. Yet Justice Lehman, writing the opinion for the court,
remarked (244 N. Y. at 248) that "conviction ..• [would hardly be] less certain if
such distinctions were drawn." In view of these observations, the decision in the Cox
case handed down I 5 years later (Justice Lehman concurring) is not a surprise. In
1939 a bill was introduced in the state legislature of New York adding a new section
to the Penal Code. It provided that "the crime of grand larceny may be established by
proof either of a single taking or of a series of takings over a period of time, provided
that in the latter case it is proved that said takings or appropriations were from the
possession of the same person and provided, further, that said several takings or appropriations constituted one single transaction or were motivated by a single intent,
impulse, or desire or constituted parts of a common scheme and plan and were committed pursuant to said common scheme and plan." The bill was defeated. SCHWARTZ
and GoFFEN, NEW YoRK CRIMINAL LAW 412,413 (1941). Two years later the court
unanimously adopted the rule quoted in the text.
11 The "continuous offense" is described in 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, 12th
ed., § II71 (1932). It was known in its technical sense to the Romans and is established
in many continental systems.
12 Regina v. Firth, L. R. l Cro. Cas. Res. l 72 ( l 869). The court stressed the fact
that the connecting pipe was at all times buried in the earth and that it always contained
some of the stolen gas.
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single larceny where the defendant's burners were connected continuously to the pipes of the gas company.13 And the fact that the means
by which the defendant deflected the stolen current did not remain
continuously in place has been held in a more recent decision to be
irrelevant and insufficient to prevent the finding of a continuous transaction.14
The second group of decisions in which the courts inv::i,riably
adhere to the rule of the New York court deals with agents and servants
who have embezzled sums of money by several distinct takings over
a period of time.15 In some cases the decision is based upon the fact
that the "specific separate peculations cannot be identified and determined," and "unless the mere result of the whole series of transactions may become the basis of one continuous offense no offense is
susceptible of proof." 16 This difficulty of proving separate offenses is
probably the historical reason for the rule although some courts reach
the same result, especially in the more recent cases, in the absence of
such difficulties. Their decisions are based on the fact that many acts are
systematically instituted and carried out.17 In other cases there appear
both a systematic series of conversions and an impossibility of establishing any separate act.18 Where the impossibility of establishing the
separate offenses of embezzlement is absent, the public policy factors
urging the finding of a single offense are not as persistent. And yet,
even though every distinct act of embezzlement could be proven sepa13
Woods v. People, 222 Ill. 293, 78 N. E. 607 (1906); 113 A. L. R. 1282
at 1286 (1938); 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520 (1907). In the Woods case again the continuous connection to the pipes by a rubber hose seems to be emphasized as essential
for the continuous character of the transaction.
H United States v. Carlos, 21 Philippine 553 (1911). One cannot escape the
conclusion that an uninterrupted taking of commodities constitutes a single offense. The
logic, however, does not compel the finding of a single offense where the taking was
interrupted {as for instance where the device by which it was effected was periodically
removed and reattached). In extending the notion of the "continuous offense," the
courts were evidently influenced by the difficulty of proving the various single takings.
It is equally clear that there is not much left of the "continuous offense" doctrine in the
technical sense.
15
I WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 10th ed., § 598 (1918). Regulated by
statutes in at least three states: California, Louisiana, Massachusetts; also in England.
16
State v. Peters, 43 Idaho 564 at 571, 253 P. 842 (1927). See also Jackson v.
State, 76 Ga. 551 (1886), where a president of a corporation embezzled money over a
period of several years and falsified the books to conceal the crime. Ker v. People, IIO
Ill. 627 (1884); State v. Reinhart, 26 Ore. 466, 38 P. 822 (1895); State v. Kurth,
105 Mont. 260, 72 P. (2d) 687 (1937).
17 Willis v. State, 134 Ala. 429 at 450, 33 So. 226 (1901); State v. Wetzel, 75
W. Va. 7, 83 S. E. 68 (1914), where a cashier embezzled over a period of years
money of his bank. The bill of particulars set up with minuteness the dates and
amounts of money appropriated at various times.
18
State v. Dawe, 31 Idaho 796, 177 P. 393 (1918).
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rately, there would be "almost as many counts in the indictment as
there were dollars in the money embezzled," 19 if all of them were to
be charged as distinct offenses.
Aside from these two groups of decisions the authorities are not
unanimous. In England, in situations where the difficulty of proving
single takings was very serious, if not insuperable,2° the older decisions
declared that "A number of distinct petty larcenies cannot be combined
so as to constitute grand larceny." 21 But in a leading and more recent
case,22 an English court held that where the lessee of a coal mine stole
coal over a period of four years from many different owners, the shaft
extending into many different counties, there was but a single offense.
In the long line of cases, this one seems to be the only one where the
court hesitatingly found a single offense where the several takings
occurred by trespass upon the distinct legal possessions of different
owners.
No American authority has gone so far as this English case, but the
majority of the courts which have passed upon the question have agreed
with the New York view. However, there are some variations in the
application of the rule. In a Mississippi case, a lessee who unlawfully
·removed loads of trees, all of which were owned by his lessor, throughout an entire winter (none of the single loads exceeding the amount
of a petty larceny) was found guilty of grand larceny.28 On the other
hand, where the defendant had stolen different parts of machinery
from one owner, and sold them regularly to a junk dealer, the court
19 Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496 at 5 13 ( l 869). General discussion in State
v. Peters, 43 Idaho 564, 253 P. 842 (1927).
20 See: Regina v. Henwood, 22 L. T. R. 486 (1870); Regina v. Shepherd, L. R.
1 Cro. Cas. Res. II8 (1868).
21 King v. Petrie, l Leach 294, 168 Eng. Rep. 249 (1784), where a servant had
stolen his master's property at different times. See also Rex v. Williams, 6 Car. & P.
626, 172 Eng. Rep. 1392 (1834), where a servant was indicted in one count for
taking a certain sum on a particular day and it developed that the money was taken in
different sums on different days; the court held that the prosecutor had to make an
election and confine himself to one sum and one particular day.
22 Regina v. Bleasdale, 2 Car. & K. 765, 175 Eng. Rep. 321 (1848). This case
could also be included in the group of cases dealing with thefts of electricity, gas, water,
oil, etc., coal being of a character somewhat similar to these commodities. Thirteen
years after the sweeping Bleasdale decision had been rendered, a statute was enacted in
England, 24 & 25 Viet., c. 96, § 71 (1861), ordering the prosecutor to elect under
certain circumstances not more than three of the distinct takings on which to proceed.
The courts helped the prosecutor to avoid the election by finding that there were no
"distinct takings" within the meaning of the statute, but a continuous transaction.
Regina v. Henwood, 22 L. T. R. 486 (1870). A similar statute has been enacted in
West Virginia and the courts have accepted the English interpretation. W. Va. Code
(1931), § 62-2-13; State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S. E. 68 (1914).
28 Dodson v. State, 130 Miss. 137, 93 So. 579 (1922). Compare Scarver v. State,
53 Miss. 407 (1876).
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found that the various thefts did not constitute a "continuous transaction." 24 In a Texas case,25 the court, attempting to set limits to
the notion of what constitutes a "continuous transaction," held that,
although several asportations from a single owner committed on one
night might be considered to be a single offense of grand larceny,
multiple thefts from a single owner committed on various nights
could not be considered one single offense. The court looked to the
letter of the Texas Code, and speaking about thefts committed on
different nights declared that, "Under our statute (Penal Code, Art.
726) these would be separate and distinct offenses." However, there is
nothing in the statute which would preclude a ruling that distinct takings executed in one night were also to be considered "separate and
distinct offenses." The unfortunate difficulty of the dilemma is clearly
reflected in the opinion. Whereas this court pointed to the letter of the
code aiming to set limits to the "continuous transaction," the California
court invoked its code for the contrary purpose in a rather ingenious
manner. 26

3.
From a consideration of the cases various factors may be suggested
as bearing upon the question whether a person who has stolen may be
convicted of several distinct larcenies or of only one single larceny.
( r) The courts require that the different takings occur at the same
place.21
( 2) The time elapsing between the takings has been declared
Patterson v. State, 171 Miss. 1, 156 So. 595 (1934).
Lacey v. State, 22 Tex. App. 657, 3 S. W. 343 {1887). See also Flynn v.
State, 47 Tex. Cr. 26, 83 S. W. 206 (1904); Cody v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 183, 20
s. w. 398 {1892).
26 People v. Dillon, 1 Cal. App. {2d) 224 at 229, 36 P. (2d) 416 (1934).
Invoking § 20 of the Penal Code, the court declares that "When appellant once formed
the felonious intent to take ••• a certain quantity of merchandise ••• but one offense
is committed, though there may have been several deliveries, for in such case there
occurs the union or joint operation of act and intent prescribed by law." Cal. Penal
Code {Deering, 1937), § 20, reads: "In every crime or public offense there must
exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence." Undoubtedly this provision was intended to embody solely the requirement of both subjective
and objective elements of the crime. The fact that the court reads in more demonstrates the difficulty in finding support for the decision in the code. Two judges
dissented. See also People v. Mills B. Sing, 42 Cal. App. 385, 183 P. 865 (1919).
27 When different objects were taken from wagons standing on the same yard,
the Missouri court held that different places were involved. State v. Maggard,
160 Mo. 469, 61 S. W. 184 (1901). Where objects were taken from conveyances
standing 300 feet apart, an Ohio court held that the taking was from the same place.
State v. Smith, IO Ohio Dec. Reprint 682, 23 Wk. L. Bull. 85 {1890). In Regina v.
Bleasdale, 2 Car. & K. 765, 175 Eng. Rep. 321 {1848), the court frankly declared
that although the coal was taken from different places, a single offense may be established. No American case has gone that far.
24

25
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irrelevant in many decisions, but there is authority, especially in
older cases, attributing some importance to the time factor. 28 Where
there are successive takings from the same place on the same criminal
expedition (there being no premeditated plan), the courts seem to require that the takings follow "closely" upon each other.29
(3) The articles taken at different times must be taken from the
same owner. The courts do not indicate the basis for this requirement,
but a possible explanation lies in the definition of larceny as a felonious
taking by trespass from the legal possession of another. It would
seem that the courts have substituted the requirement of single ownership for the requirement of a single legal possession on the assumption
that possession and ownership are united in the same person.so
(4) A "single criminal impulse" is required. It is difficult to foresee with certainty the situations in which the court will allow the jury
to find such an impulse, but this must be determined by scrutininzing
as a whole all the circumstances of the crime, e.g., the regularity of the
thefts, the general scheme pursuant to which they have been committed,
and the relation between the thief and his victim.s1
(5) The manner in which the question arises is a factor of importance, and peculiarly so in those cases where there is but one taking of
several articles owned by different persons.
Where the question arises on the issue whether or not a thief may
be convicted of grand larceny by combining several petty larcenies into
28

Lacey v. State. 22 Tex. Cr. 657, 3 S. W. 383 (1887).
In Rex v. Birdseye, I Car. & P. 386, 172 Eng. Rep. 751 (1830), it was
held that where there was an intermission of two minutes between the taking of
several articles, this was one transaction; but that it was otherwise when there was an
intermission of half an hour. See also In re Jones, 46 Mont. 122, 126 P. 929 (1912);
32 AM. JuR. 894-896 (1941).
so There is authority which may be relied upon to justify the abandonment of
this requirement. See Regina v. Bleasdale, 2 Car. & K. 765, 175 Eng. Rep. 321
(1848).
81
The following circumstances coupled with other facts led the courts to find
a "single criminal impulse." A conspiracy embracing all the takings, making a "racket''
out of the regular takings and hiring a safety box for the money regularly stolen,
People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137, 36 N. E. (2d) 84 (1941); acting pursuant to a single
offer to pay for the several criminal acts, State v. Ray, 62 Wash. 582, I 14 P. 439
(1911); the fact that the victim was drunk during the execution of all the criminal
acts, Flynn v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 26, 83 S. W. 206 (1904). Where a lessee steals objects
on the leased premises or an employee commits thefts in the place of his employment, the
court will be more likely to find a single general scheme than in the case of a stranger
stealing regularly from the same place. Dodson v. State, 130 Miss. 137, 93 So. 743
(1922); State v. Patterson, 171 Miss. 1, 156 So. 595 (1934). A master-servant relation
combined with the probability that the takings occurred within a short absence of the
employer warranted the finding of the necessary "general scheme." West v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 99 S. E. 654 (1919). See also State v. Mandich, 24 Nev. 336,
54 P. 516 (1898).
29
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one offense, the view illustrated by the New York court 82 seems desirable. Such a decision undoubtedly tends to satisfy the demand for
expiation and deterrence, which still are the aims of the criminal law.
And when consideration is given to the difficulties which the prosecutor
often has to face in proving the several takings, one cannot deny the
force of this conclusion. On the other hand, the language of the statutes
dealing with the crime of larceny does not lend itself readily to the
interpretation that several distinct takings may be combined into a
single offense. Furthermore, the vague and hopelessly frrational element of a "single criminal impulse" and the possibility of an unlimited
extension of the rule are not without danger and would suggest a legislative solution of the problem.88

82 People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137, 36 N. E. (2d) 84 (1941), discussed supra at
note 10.
83 At least two continental views should be mentioned. The Austrian Penal Code,
§ 173, provides for the computation of the values of the objects stolen in the following
manner: "it does not make any difference whether this amount consists of values
resulting from a single or from several, simultaneous or repeated attacks, or whether
it was stolen from one or several owners, or whether the theft was committed on one
or on several objects." LAMMASCH, GRUNDRISS DES OSTERREICHISCHEN STRAFRECHTES,
5th ed., 275 (1926). On the other hand, 4 CARRARA, PROGRAMMA DEL CoRso DI
DIRITTO CRIMINALE, 6th ed., parte speciale, § 2064 ( I 898), claims that the doctrine
of the continuing theft is a pure fiction (since in fact there are distinct offenses) and
can therefore never be used for increasing the punishment and was introduced in the
legal system only to help out the defendant where the punishment for the distinct
offenses would exceed that for the continuing transaction as a single offense.

